The Situation
For over two decades the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group has terrorized communities in northern Uganda and across central Africa, abducting as many as 66,000 children along the way. But behind the brutality of LRA leader Joseph Kony and his top commanders lies a deeper story – a history of division and discord in Uganda that gave rise to their rebellion and that still casts a storm cloud over the country’s future. Though the conflict has now outlasted four US Presidents, President Obama and Congressional leaders now have a unique window of opportunity to help put a stop to the LRA’s atrocities and put northern Uganda on track towards lasting peace.
Roots of the conflict: The conflict in northern Uganda
has deep roots, tracing back to British colonial policies of
divide-and-rule that exacerbated ethnic tensions and set the stage for
a series of post-independence dictators, including the infamous Idi
Amin, who ruled the country by fear and iron fist.
The war’s most recent roots date to 1986, when a band of rebels from
southern Uganda led by Yoweri Museveni, Uganda’s current president,
took control of the government. Human rights abuses committed by
Museveni’s army sparked a succession of northern rebellions, the most
enduring of which has been that of the LRA, led by former altar boy
Joseph Kony. However, the rebel group has long since lost popular
support in the north, instead terrorizing the very people it claimed to
represent and relying on abducted children to sustain itself.
The Ugandan government’s response to the LRA’s atrocities was equally
disastrous for northern Ugandans. In the 1990s the Ugandan government
forced most of northern Uganda’s population into crowded, squalid
displacement camps where as many as 1,000 people died each week. The
Ugandan military regularly committed sexual abuse and other crimes
against northerners, while failing to protect them from frequent LRA
attacks.
In 2005 the conflict took a dramatic turn, as the International
Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Kony and top LRA commanders
on charges including war crimes, and the rebels began pulling out of
Uganda and establishing bases in the DR Congo. The next year the
Ugandan government and LRA began peace talks, which culminated in a
final agreement in April 2008. However, the peace process had failed to
gain the buy-in of LRA leader Joseph Kony, who refused to sign the
agreement and began consolidating his forces in the DR Congo.
A return to war: Despite continued efforts to
convince Kony to sign the agreement, the LRA leader ordered his army to
begin preparing for a new round of violence. In September 2008 he
unleashed his fighters on communities in northeastern Congo, abducting
hundreds of children and taking control of an area the size of
Connecticut.
In December 2008 a Ugandan-led military offensive against the LRA’s
Congolese bases caused a dramatic escalation of violence. The poorly
planned offensive failed to surprise the elusive rebel leaders, who
responded by ordering massive reprisal attacks on civilians in
vulnerable areas of the DR Congo and Sudan. In the space of a few short
months, the LRA killed over 850 innocent people and displaced hundreds
of thousands more. In March of 2009, the Ugandan army ended its
offensive after failing to capture top LRA commanders, who continue to
order attacks against communities in the region.
US role in the conflict: The nature of US involvement
in this crisis has changed considerably over the past two decades.
Historically, the US has strongly supported President’s Museveni’s
government despite it’s abysmal handling of the conflict in northern
Uganda, providing it with military, financial and political support.
This relationship caused the U.S. to turn a blind eye to the Ugandan
government’s criminal neglect of the crisis and failure to credibly
attempt to end it, as well as contributing to the U.S.’ own neglect of
the situation. After favoring unachievable military “solutions” to
ending the war for many years, the U.S. reversed its position in 2007
and sent a diplomat to the region to work in support of the
then-ongoing peace talks. Despite this welcomed engagement, the
negotiations failed to secure Joseph Kony’s signature on the final
peace agreement.
How it ends: Kony’s refusal to sign the peace
agreement and his decision to continue committing brutal atrocities
throughout the region has made it clear that he remains the biggest
immediate obstacle to peace. However, as regional governments and UN
forces do not have the capacity to stop LRA attacks, it is essential
that the US and the international community support a viable,
responsible effort to arrest Kony. Any such operation must target top
LRA leaders exclusively, avoid endangering captives within the LRA, and
be accompanied by a strategy to protect vulnerable civilians from rebel
reprisal attacks. Such pressure may even force Kony to finally take
concrete, genuine steps towards a negotiated solution.
However, the arrest of Kony and the disarming of the LRA will not alone
bring sustainable peace to northern Uganda. Without significant and
steady progress on rebuilding war-affected communities, reconciling
Uganda’s regional and ethnic divisions, and creating a more inclusive
government, the possibility of renewed violence threatens the country’s
future. US financial assistance for reconstruction and political
pressure on the Ugandan government to get serious about recovery and
reconciliation could prove to be key catalysts for a truly sustainable
peace in Uganda.
Use the links on the right or below to find out more about what the history of this war and what's been happening recently: