Prospects for Peace

After two decades of neglect, peace may finally be on the horizon for the people of northern Uganda. The peace process between the LRA and Government of Uganda began in July 2006 and has been widely hailed as the best opportunity in over a decade to end their 22-year war. Unlike previous attempts to negotiate a peace settlement, this process is being led by the Government of South Sudan, a factor that adds new legitimacy and accountability. Also for the first time, peace talks are being held outside of Uganda with the involvement of such strategic mediation, another reason they have a greater likelihood of succeeding than prior efforts.

Negotiations between the Government of Uganda and LRA began in July in Juba, South Sudan. LRA leader Joseph Kony appointed a delegation of negotiators, mostly from Diaspora networks in Europe, North America and other parts of East Africa. The delegations in Juba agreed on a five-point agenda: (1) cessation of hostilities; (2) comprehensive solutions to the war; (3) reconciliation and accountability; (4) formal ceasefire; and (5) disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. In August, the parties reached the breakthrough Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) Agreement, bringing relative calm to northern Uganda for the first time in years. In the following months, there were virtually no attacks or abductions in the region, and 300,000 displaced persons returned home. The numbers of child "night commuters" fell to their lowest levels in a decade.

The talks were delayed again in early 2007 due to disagreements over the agenda, particularly regarding the inclusion of comprehensive solutions to the war. In January, the LRA delegation refused to return to Juba, demanding a new mediator and venue. Fortunately, the intervention of both northern Ugandan leaders and the new UN special envoy, former Mozambican president Joaquim Chissano, convinced the LRA to return to talks. Chissano's role as a respected African elder and statesman was reportedly crucial in convincing LRA leader Joseph Kony to return to negotiations. As part of the reached compromise, five countries (Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, Mozambique and DR Congo) have sent high-level observers to supplement the GoSS mediation. Additionally, the African Union (AU) agreed to coordinate eight new ceasefire monitors.

Peace talks resumed on 26 April in Juba. After more wrangling over alleged ceasefire violations, the parties signed an agreement on the second agenda item, "comprehensive solutions to the conflict." This was quickly followed by an agreement in June on the contentious issue of "accountability and reconciliation." The parties agreed to develop an alternative national justice framework, a hybrid of trials and traditional justice mechanisms, to deal with accountability. Once a final agreement is reached, the Ugandan goverment has said it will ask the International Criminal Court to revoke arrest warrants for top rebel leaders. This was a major breakthrough, but the details remain to be finalized.

To present, the negotiations have been on hiatus for both sides to conduct ‘consultations’ with civil society on the third agreement. Funding disputes again delayed this process for three months, but the LRA have finally begun their "consultations" in Uganda. There is renewed optimism that the peace process is back on track. If consultations continue without delays, negotiations in Juba should resume in mid-December or early January.

Still, the past few months have exposed old dynamics that threaten to undermine this progress. For one, Ugandan President Museveni is reporting considering regional military action against the rebels if significant progress is not made by January 2008. Meanwhile, fractures and fighting within the rebel ranks have raised fears that the LRA may withdraw or pull back from the negotiations. Without greater regional and international investment in the peace process, these emerging threats could once again undermine the hopes of northern Ugandans for peace.

Past Peace Initiatives

Since the war began, there have been several attempts to reach a peaceful resolution. The first peace initiative brokered the Gulu Pece Stadium Accord, signed in July 1988 between the northern Uganda People's Defense Army (UPDA) and government. The UPDA, an antecedent to the LRA, waged a popular rebellion when President Museveni came to power by military coup in 1986. The Pece Accord was essentially an amnesty package, allowing UPDA fighters to join the national military. Following this agreement, the Ugandan government reached the Addis Ababa Accord with the political wing of the UPDA. These two peace agreements are very important because they provide successful examples of resolution when the Ugandan government fully commits to peace. Further, these accords succeeded because a certain level of trust was established between both sides.

The Government of Uganda's first real attempt to negotiate with LRA leader Joseph Kony came in 1993 when the government authorized then Minister for the Pacification of the North, Betty Bigombe, to negotiate with the rebels. In 1994, Bigombe was hours away from brokering a peace agreement between the two sides, when President Museveni declared a seven-day ultimatum for the rebels to surrender. It is unclear why he made this shift, though some argue that it is an example of President Museveni's intention of ending the conflict militarily. Others contend that the LRA was receiving funding from the Government of Sudan, prompting President Museveni to question their commitment to peace. Regardless, these negotiations were the best prospect for peace until the latest process.

Since then, there have been a number of vague attempts to lay the groundwork for negotiations. In 1997, a group of Acholi Diaspora in Europe and North America formed Kacoke Madit, an organization advocating a peaceful resolution of the war. The group held a conference in London in April of that year, which included attempts to allow the LRA to form a political wing and articulate its political agenda. Also in 1997, traditional and religious leaders came together to form the Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative (ARLPI). This group has since engaged in confidence-building efforts to facilitate peace talks. Further in 1997, the community of Sant' Egidio, a Catholic lay group out of Rome, met with the parties and offered to mediate negotiations. However, these attempts failed, primarily because of the LRA's lack of a clear political agenda. Sant' Egidio and ARLPI have continued to operate in northern Uganda, working to establish peace talks.

Arguably the most important initiative before the Juba peace talks was the Amnesty Act of 2000, which offered amnesty to LRA fighters who surrendered and denounced violence. Since 2000, the Amnesty Commission has received more than 8,000 "reporters" from the LRA. This includes several mid-level and top LRA commanders. Though the Amnesty Act has been instrumental in weaning the numbers of LRA, there have been some problems. First, only about half of the amnesty packages have been distributed. Second, many former LRA fighters remain discontented because they return to the squalid displacement camps and lack basic resources. Some have even expressed their desire to return to the rebel army because camp conditions are so poor.

Since 2002, there have been new attempts to restart negotiations, but contradictory statements by both sides have perpetuated a climate of mistrust. In August 2002, President Museveni declared a unilateral one-week ceasefire, welcoming peace talks. The rebels refused, though Joseph Kony called a radio show that December, expressing his willingness to negotiate. However, a proposed face-to-face meeting in March 2003 between the parties fell apart due to UPDF activity in the "peace contact area." One year later, Museveni again expressed readiness to negotiate with the LRA. This came one day after the UN Security Council was briefed on the situation in northern Uganda. In May 2004, the LRA agreed to negotiate. After some delay, both parties agreed to several ceasefires at the end of 2004. Betty Bigombe returned to Uganda in her role as chief peace mediator, and began communicating between the parties. However, mistrust and the lack of international leverage again spoiled efforts to secure peace.

In 2005, Bigombe continued her attempts to rejuvenate a peace process. She successfully brokered the first face-to-face meeting between the parties in over a decade. Yet, limited resources and lack of international support for her initiative undermined her courageous efforts. By the end of 2005, northern Ugandan leaders began meeting with their counterparts in South Sudan, exploring potential for Sudanese mediation. These efforts led to the current Juba peace talks.

It is important to recognize and learn from the long history of peace initiatives. If nothing else, it is clear that skillful and committed mediation is not enough to overcome the deep-seated mistrust and conflicting signals from the parties. External engagement and leverage from the region and international community is critical to build the necessary confidence for peace.