Understanding the changes made to the Senate version of the LRA/N. Uganda bill

On Tuesday, November 17th the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act made it one step closer to President Obama's desk when it received unanimous approval from Senate Foreign Relations Committee, making it eligible for a vote in the full Senate. The version of the legislation approved by the Senate committee in November includes several minor changes to the original text that was introduced in May 2009. The two primary goals of the legislation remain the same in both versions - to help permanently stop LRA violence and investing in sustainable peace in Uganda. Below is a point-by-point guide to how the language changes in the new version of the Senate legislation reinforce these goals even further.

Emphasizing a multilateral approach to addressing LRA violence

The original version of S.1067 made it clear that US efforts to address LRA violence should be coordinated with the international community and regional actors, reinforcing the Obama Administration’s promises to renew US efforts to work multilaterally to help resolve the crisis. The new version of the bill reemphasizes this point in several sections.

Language changes
Sec. 3 (Statement of US Policy):

  • Sec. 3: Changed to remove the phrase “eliminating the threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army to civilians and regional stability”

Sec. 4 (President Obama’s LRA Strategy)

  • Sec. 4 title: changed from “Requirement of a Regional Strategy for Disarming the Lord’s Resistance Army” to “Requirement of a Regional Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the Lord’s Resistance Army”
  • Sec. 4(b)1: now explicitly states that US efforts to help protect civilians from LRA attacks should strengthen ongoing efforts by the United Nations and regional governments to do so.
  • Sec. 4(b)2: The section on President Obama’s strategy to address LRA violence no longer reads that the President should devise a “viable plan to… eliminate the threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army.” Instead, it mandates that the strategy shall include “An assessment of viable options through which the United States, working with regional governments, could help develop and support multilateral efforts to eliminate the threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army.”

Clarifying US support for the possibility of a genuine negotiated solution

The original language of the bill states that it is the policy of the US to support multilateral efforts to “apprehend or remove from the battlefield” Joseph Kony and top LRA commanders, reflecting Kony’s refusal to genuinely engage a peace process or halt ongoing attacks against civilians in central Africa. The original language also left open the possibility of LRA leaders accepting a negotiated solution to the conflict, reflecting the longstanding support by the bill’s authors for genuine peace processes. In the new version of the Senate legislation, the emphasis on US support for viable multilateral efforts to apprehend top LRA leaders is complimented by a more explicit mention such efforts should only be pursued if there continue to be no viable efforts to achieve a genuine negotiated solution.

Language changes
Sec. 3 (Statement of US Policy):

  • Sec. 3: phrase “to apprehend or remove Joseph Kony and his top commanders from the battlefield” now reads “to apprehend or remove Joseph Kony and his top commanders from the battlefield in the continued absence of a negotiated solution”

Ensuring President Obama’s LRA strategy includes a comprehensive approach to rebel violence

Section 4 of the legislation requires that President Obama come up with a strategy to address LRA violence in central Africa. The original version outlined elements of a comprehensive approach to the LRA, recommending the Administration employ an interagency policy process and regional diplomatic engagement to help  protect civilians from LRA attacks, permanently stop rebel violence, and support long-term peacebuilding efforts. The new version of the legislation reinforces the need for such a comprehensive approach by mandating that the Obama Administration’s LRA strategy include these elements.  

Language changes
Section 4 (President Obama’s LRA strategy)

  • Sec. 4(b): phrase “Content of Strategy.—The strategy should include the following:” changed to “Content of Strategy.—The strategy shall include the following:”

Improving provisions to provide humanitarian aid to LRA-communities in central Africa

The old version of the legislation included a provision recognizing the humanitarian crisis facing communities in central Africa affected by recent LRA attacks and authorizing President Obama to provide $10 million in emergency aid to respond to their needs.  The new version gives additional emphasis to the urgency of assisting LRA-affected communities in central Africa, and clarifies that the $10 million in emergency aid should be in addition to existing US funds targeting these communities.

Language changes
Sec. 3 (Statement of Policy)

  • Sec. 3(2): Provision added stating that it is US policy to target assistance to LRA-affected communities in DR Congo, southern Sudan and Central African Republic.
Sec. 5 (Assistance to LRA-affected communities in central Africa)
  • Sec. 5(b): Phrase “The President is authorized to provide assistance to respond to the humanitarian needs…” changed to “The President is authorized to provide additional assistance to respond to the humanitarian needs…”

Strengthening President Obama’s mandate to support transitional justice and reconstruction in Uganda

The new Senate legislation strengthens provisions in the original version meant to ensure more robust US efforts to hold the Ugandan government accountable to its promises to help war-affected communities recover and support transitional justice initiatives in Uganda. The new version of the legislation explicitly recognizes that improved leadership from senior Ugandan officials is needed to achieve progress in reconstruction efforts and includes more nuance on steps the Ugandan government should take to implement recovery plans in a transparent manner. It also includes a more comprehensive section on transitional justice and gives President Obama a strengthened mandate to support transitional justice and reconciliation initiatives in Uganda.

Language changes:
Sec. 6 (Recovery and reconstruction in northern Uganda)

  • Sec. 6(b)2: Clarifies that the Ugandan government should increase oversight activities and reporting on recovery efforts in northern Uganda at the “local and national level” within the country.
  • Sec. 6(c): Language added that in addition to increasing funds for reconstruction in northern Uganda, the US and other international donors should “better leverage those contributions to enhance the capacity and encourage the leadership of the Government of Uganda in promoting transparent and accountable reconstruction in northern Uganda.”
  • Sec. 6(d): Language added to encourage the Ugandan government to take “proactive steps” to ensure reconstruction and reconciliation efforts in northern Uganda are implemented in a transparent and accountable manner.

Sec. 7 (Transitional justice in Uganda)

  • Sec. 7(a): Provision regarding the importance of transitional justice in Uganda moved from Sec. 2 to Sec. 7 and made into a more meaningful “Sense of Congress”
  • Sec. 7(b): Language changed from “Sense of Congress” to “Authority” to give President Obama a strengthened mandate to support transitional justice initiatives in Uganda.

Calling for the US support to civil society work on transitional justice and reconstruction in Uganda

The statement of policy in the new version of the legislation states that it is the policy of the US government to assist civil society efforts to work for lasting peace in Uganda.

Language changes
Sec. 3 (Statement of Policy):

  • Sec. 3(3): States that the US should “support and encourage” civil society efforts to “promote comprehensive reconstruction, transitional justice, and reconciliation in northern Uganda”

Clarifying that possible future “termination of assistance” will not affect US humanitarian funds

The original version of the legislation includes a provision that encourages US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to withhold assistance to Uganda if its government is not taking sufficient steps to support reconstruction and reconciliation in northern Uganda. The new version of the legislation retains this provision, but clarifies that any withholding of aid should not affect essential US humanitarian assistance to Ugandan communities.

Language changes
Sec. 6 (Recovery and reconstruction in northern Uganda)

  • Sec. 6(d): clarifies that any future withholding of funds from Uganda should only affect “non-humanitarian” funds the US provides to Ugandan communities.

Recognizing special needs of men, women and children in DDR processes

The old version of the legislation included a provision calling for President Obama to support the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former LRA fighters and abductees. The new version of the legislation retains this provision, while adding language to recognize the special needs of men, women and children throughout DDR efforts.

Language changes
Sec. 6 (Recovery and reconstruction in northern Uganda)

  • Sec. 6(a)5: phrase added to existing language that US support for DDR efforts in Uganda should give “attention given to the roles and needs of men, women and children”

Removing the Air Force offset to pay for US assistance authorized in the bill

The original version of the Senate legislation included a provision that would pay for the humanitarian assistance and transitional justice authorizations in the bill by reducing funds appropriated to the Air Force to buy excess parts by $40 million. In the new version of the bill, this provision is removed.