Insecurity and Inadequate Protection
In 1986 forces under the command of current President Yoweri
Museveni swept to power in Uganda
after five years of civil war, overthrowing a government composed primarily of
northern Ugandans. After capturing Kampala,
Museveni’s forces committed widespread massacres and human rights violations as
they attempted to ‘pacify’ the north. The LRA rebellion grew out of efforts to
resist Museveni’s rule, but eventually turned its brutality against the civilian
population in the north, abducting children to replenish its ranks and committing
massacres and mutilations during raids.
However, the Ugandan government’s response, "protected
villages" for civilians and military operations against the rebels, has failed
to provide adequate security for northerners. The UPDF, the Ugandan national
army, has traditionally been reluctant to protect camps and has instead
concentrated its military might on offensive measures, leaving displaced
persons concentrated in camps and vulnerable to retaliatory LRA attacks. Local
civilian militias (LDUs) created by the military, though somewhat effective in
deterring the LRA in Lango and Teso regions, are poorly trained, lack accountability
and are prone to committing human rights abuses against those they are tasked
with protecting. The U.S.
and international community have been complicit in the widespread insecurity by
providing financial and military aid to the Ugandan government while neglecting
to adequately press it to improve protection of civilians and address human
rights abuses.
Operation Iron Fist, an offensive against LRA bases in Sudan in 2002, is a prime example of the failure of the military solution. Though it weakened the LRA, the operation led to an increased frequency of LRA attacks on camps in northern Uganda and expanded the displacement crisis further south into Lango and Teso. Military threats and offensives have also disrupted attempted peace talks between the LRA and Ugandan government, notably in 1993 and 2003, and recent militaristic rhetoric from Kampala and Washington DC threatens to disrupt the ongoing Juba peace talks.
The Ugandan government's reliance on forced internment for protection and military solutions for victory - and its failure to address the ensuing humanitarian catastrophe - has deepened divisions between northerners and the national government. Although a vast majority of northerners disapprove of the LRA rebellion, many are reluctant to support a military solution that targets children abducted from their own communities and forced to fight. Indeed, northerners' overwhelming support of the Juba peace talks (and the vastly improved security they have created) is compelling evidence that the Juba peace process is the most effective strategy the Ugandan government can pursue to protect civilians.



